EXHIBIT 8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EX PARTE APPLICATION) CASE NO: 2:10-CV-8583-ODW-SH PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 1782 OF DENORO INVESTMENTS LIMITED,) ET AL., CIVIL Plaintiffs, Los Angeles, California vs. Friday, November 12, 2010 ASHOT EGIAZARYAN, (10:10 a.m. to 11:17 a.m.) Defendant. IN RE APPLICATION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. SECTION) 1782 OF DENORO INVESTMENT) CASE NO: 2:10-MC-00387 (SH) LIMITED, Plaintiff, vs. DENORO INVESTMENTS LIMITED, Defendant.

EX PARTE APPLICATION, MOTION TO COMPEL AND APPLICATION TO QUASH SUBPOENA

BEFORE THE HONORABLE STEPHEN J. HILLMAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Appearances:

See next page

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EXCEPTIONAL REPORTING SERVICES, INC

3 1 Los Angeles, California; Friday, November 12, 2010; 10:10 a.m. 2 (Call to Order) 3 THE CLERK: Magistrate Judge presiding. Calling Case 4 Number CV-10-8583, also Case Number 10-MC-387. This is in the 5 matter of the Ex Parte Application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782 of Denoro Investment, Limited. Counsel, please enter your 6 7 appearance for the record. THE COURT: And the cross motion. 9 MR. MANSFIELD: Good morning, your Honor, Steve 10 Mansfield and Chad Stegeman of Akin Gump for Denoro Investments Limited. 11 12 THE COURT: Good morning. 13 MR. SUH: Good morning, your Honor, Maurice Suh 14 appearing on behalf of Mr. Ashot Egiazaryan. With me here at 15 Counsel table is Larry Shore and Daniel Weiss. They are both 16 with Gibson Dunn, as am I. 17 THE COURT: Good morning. I apologize for the brief 18 delay. I was sitting for the Cypriot bar exam, as we all were, 19 I quess. 20 Having gone through all the papers twice -- and I 21 have no reply to either motion; is that correct? I just have 22 oppositions but not --23 MR. SUH: That's correct, your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Yeah. What it pretty much comes down to 25 for me is I would like to hear from you, Mr. Suh, a response to

1 Denoro's opposition paper which I just received myself a few 2 minutes ago --opposition of Denoro to respondent's ex parte 3 application to quash --4 MR. SUH: Yes, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: -- and I just would like your response on 6 the four Intel factors. 7 Thank you, your Honor. Judge, as I MR. SUH: 8 prefaced to my comments about the Intel factors, I think it's 9 valuable for us to put into context how the Intel factors, we 10 believe, set forth to guide this Court about the critical issue 11 of extending this Court's power into a foreign proceeding that 12 will materially impact both the Cyprus action as well as the 13 London arbitration. We believe that the Intel factors are focused on the appropriate measure of comity and respect for 14 15 the foreign jurisdiction. We believe that this is not a 16 mechanistic application of the factors but a holistic 17 application of them to judge that very impact and when we 18 examine them as they are here, we believe there is no 19 justification for permitting Mr. Egiazaryan's deposition at 20 this time in these very complicated matters with the many 21 parties at issue. 22 It comes down to we believe there are two fundamental 23 pillars of Denoro's argument and they come right out of the 24 opposition to our motion to quash. The first is Denoro wants 25 Mr. Egiazaryan's deposition because -- and I'm reading from

5 Page 7 -- that they think it will be more compelling and let me 1 2 quote it exactly. "Denoro's denial of facts alleged in the 3 affidavit with which the Cyprus Plaintiffs obtained 4 the Cyprus order will not be as compelling as 5 Mr. Egiazaryan's own admissions that he misstated or 6 admitted material facts in that affidavit" and that 7 Egiazaryan is Artem (phonetic) Egiazaryan, the affiant in the 8 case. 9 The second pillar of their argument is contained on 10 Page 8 that in essence this Court should simply order the 11 deposition of Ashot Egiazaryan and let the Cypriot Court sort 12 out its admissibility. We believe these two pillars seek to 13 fundamentally re-write the law under Section 1782, that if it 14 was always the case that simply that the moving party wanted to 15 have in their opinion a discovery procedure which they felt was 16 better than that was afforded to them, in many cases that 17 discovery would always be ordered when directed to U.S. 18 discovery procedures and secondly, of course, that the argument 19 that somehow the depositions would simply be ordered and then 20 let the foreign jurisdiction sort it out would be an abdication of the Intel factors. In that case we never would need to 21 22 examine either one of those. 23 And when we look at these -- the two fundamental 24 pillars of their opposition, I think it in fact attempts to, as 25 I've mentioned, rewrite the law on Section 1782 and those four

factors which we will examine I guess in greater detail right now.

So on the first factor, we think that in response to our argument that of course Mr. Ashot Egiazaryan is not just a party but he is the plaintiff in the action that the issue is really not whether or not they would prefer to have the deposition testimony of Mr. Egiazaryan but in fact whether or not that information, the evidence, is in fact available to Denoro and that is in fact precisely the situation --

THE COURT: What do you mean "available"?

MR. SUH: Available to Denoro in that Mr. Egiazaryan — Artem Egiazaryan is subject to cross examination on his affidavit and the reason why ostensibly the deposition of Ashot Egiazaryan is sought by Denoro is for the purpose of testing whether or not there is missing or incomplete or false information in Artem Egiazaryan's affidavit.

Now, that evidence is in fact available to Denoro through the cross examination of Artem. Denoro has made the decision that for them, it is better for them to in fact simply try to get this through Ashot Egiazaryan but that really isn't the test under Intel Factor Number 1. Intel Factor Number 1 really looks at whether or not the evidence is obtainable. Whether or not the evidence obtainable is the key factor and that factor -- that is exactly the case here and there are two things, I think, that highlight this difference between what

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the law is and what Denoro attempts to do here.

The first thing is it is clear they have not tried to do anything in order to get that evidence and secondly -- and I guess the key point there is that they had the -- they have the ability to get documents from Artem Egiazaryan as well as from Ashot Egiazaryan but instead they've elected to go straight to the deposition. They have not done anything in order to determine whether or not the evidence is obtainable and this is not --

THE COURT: And that would be via the London arbitration or the Cyprus action?

MR. SUH: By the Cypriot -- the Cypriot rules. The Cypriot rules permit for this and I think these facts really highlight the difference between the Servico case which is repeatedly cited by Denoro's Counsel and what is in fact present here because in Servico, what we had there is the non-moving party resisted attempts to get the underlying foundational evidence which would have allowed that evidence to be used in the Venezuelan court. There was an affirmative effort by the parties in the foreign jurisdiction to get that evidence and it was because there was a resistance to get it in that jurisdiction, it was unobtainable and the Court commented, well, we have a corporation located in our district. This is a technical violation and this renders it a very unique circumstance.

Those circumstances don't exist here and, in fact, if the Court were to apply Intel Factor 1 against Mr. Ashot Egiazaryan in this circumstance, that Intel Factor 1 would be meaningless because in many places in the world, there is nothing more powerful compared to their procedures than a videotaped, transcribed deposition, especially at the stage that they seek to use it and in many ways parties — moving parties would always be able to say, we like this better. They would come into Court — the U.S. Court and say, we would like to get this discovery tool.

We haven't done anything in the foreign court to try to obtain the very evidence and we want to get it against the party and, again, we have not been able to identify any case that says that such a great extension of the law under Intel Factor Number 1 and so we think Intel Factor 1, we would submit, your Honor, squarely weighs in favor of Mr. Ashot Egiazaryan and furthermore that the case that they cite, Servico, is an example of precisely why that is true.

With respect to Intel Factor Number 2, again I think this issue is also squarely in Mr. Ashot Egiazaryan's favor because the Cypriot Court cannot and will not consider any deposition examination of anyone at this stage in the injunction proceeding and this is something, again, out of respect for comity and the procedures in the foreign jurisdiction, we submit that U.S. Courts should not get

involved.

Again, there are many procedures in place in foreign jurisdictions around the world where depositions are not permitted at preliminary stages and that's exactly what we have here, a very preliminary stage. There is — I would note that Denoro has repeatedly stated in its opposition papers that the Court has not issued any rulings or made any statements that it would not receive evidence that was developed in the United States. I feel that this is — really only tells half the story and, in fact, provides an inaccurate picture of what has happened here because the issues that we're talking about here have never in fact been raised in the Cypriot Court and thereby would allow the Court to comment on it in the first instance.

So the Cypriot Court is sitting there unknowledgeable about this procedure going on here in the United States and in fact it has not received any requests to get any of the evidence with which they would otherwise be entitled under Cypriot rules.

THE COURT: Would it be helpful to them on an international basis to see that we are assisting the procedures and letting them make the final decision as to admissibility?

MR. SUH: Well, Judge, I think we would submit in that circumstance that if that were the case, then we would never need any of the Intel factors. If the point is simply to always allow the moving party to get their Section 1782 relief,

to then throw it back to the other foreign jurisdiction to make the decision, we feel that would be a -- in fact, an abdication of the Section 1782 factors.

And might I add one thing here which I'll get to in a moment? Because this is holistic approach to the situation at hand, even if that were true, Judge -- even if it were true that in some circumstances we would do that, we would strongly urge the Court not to do it here because, as I'll talk about, there are real -- there's a real prejudicial effect for Mr. Ashot Egiazaryan. This is not a simple proceeding occurring by itself alone. This is a proceeding which is part of the London arbitration which, again, has its own set of rules and as I'll speak more about in a moment, that he would suffer severe prejudice.

So even if it were true, Judge, that in some circumstances we would order the -- you would order the requested deposition but then turn around and allow the foreign jurisdiction the decision about its admissibility, there are many factors here that would render it, we believe, very inappropriate in the circumstance.

With respect to Intel Factor Number 3 --

THE COURT: One thing on 2, and I have not had a chance to read the case law in the opposition brief but there is a Ninth Circuit case I see, Advanced Micro Devices, noting the Court rejected a requirement regarding admissibility in the

11 foreign tribunal citing another Ninth Circuit case. 1 2 have any comment on that case -- those cases? 3 MR. SUH: I do, Judge. We have seen a long line of 4 citation to cases about just pure admissibility and again we 5 feel that is a very different factor in this case and this goes 6 to whether or not there is a substantive versus a procedural 7 issue about whether or not to admit this evidence. This is not 8 -- we are not asking the Court to make the determination that, 9 for example, there's a hearsay exception or a foundational 10 issue. 11 What we're asking the Court to recognize that under 12 Cypriot procedure -- Cypriot procedural rules, they will not 13 hear this testimony. They will not hear this evidence at this 14 time and part of that is -- arises, as you can from 15 Mr. Javiar's (phonetic) declaration, in the structure of the 16 way the preliminary injunction proceeding is held, that is, 17 that there is in essence a kind of TRO issued and there is an 18 application on that injunction. The affiants are cross 19 examined and the cross examination of those affiants then 20 proceeds forward. We --21 THE COURT: So -- excuse me. So these Ninth Circuit 22 cases, I take it, refer to evidentiary rules, not procedural 23 rules? 24 MR. SUH: One moment, Judge. 25 Judge, before I say unequivocally yes, I think I

12 would want to briefly review those cases. But I would like to 1 2 point out one critical factor that I think would affect the 3 Court's analysis of this, is that these cases dealt with a 4 statutory fact -- the statutory factors, not the discretionary factors at issue; That is, whether admissibility is required to 5 6 establish one of the statutory factors, and not the 7 discretionary factors in the Intel case. 8 But, your Honor, I think these cases, at base, do 9 nothing to change the analysis that from a structural 10 standpoint these are not raw procedural admissibility 11 arguments, and this argument -- these are the -- this is the 12 exact same issue raised in the opposition to quash on page 10, 13 where Denoro says -- makes the distinction between a 14 substantive limit on the admissibility of discovered evidence versus a procedural limitation. 15 16 And I think the substantive limitation is exactly 17 what we have here. The substantive limitation is the 18 limitation that under the structure of the Cypress rules and 19 the Cypriot procedure on handling an injunction proceeding, 20 that it is -- it is -- would be -- the Cypriot court would not 21 be receptive to that requested discovery. 22 Lastly -- well, actually, next Intel factor number 23 three: the circumvention of foreign proof-gathering. 24 Again, we'd submit that Intel factor number three is 25 closely tied to Intel factor number two, especially as it

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applies to substantive limitations here. Again, there is,
under the circumvention of foreign proof-gathering issues,
there is -- we have the same issues with respect to the absence
of Denoro to make any affirmative effort to obtain the evidence
that they feel is important or at least the evidence that they
have put forward as the reason for the Section 1782.

And, again, I would make the point here that this is not an exhaustion of remedies argument, as I think has been made in the opposition papers. It is -- we're not saying that they need to exhaust their remedies. We simply are saying that if they want to fall within the exceptions of these very unique cases like Servico, that the facts here simply don't justify it. And if you were to apply the analysis that, again, they are -- that Denoro is using here, the Section 1782 factors would literally be gutted; that we would have persons, applicants, coming in saying, "Well, we want this discovery; it's really -- you know, we really may not be able to use it there, but, Judge, simply order it and let them decide, and we haven't made any affirmative effort to get the evidence, and we're doing it right against a party that's subject to the jurisdiction of that court." And I think when you look at this, again, holistically, this is precisely the kind of case that a Section 1782 deposition should be ordered -- should not be ordered.

So, that takes us to Intel factor number three. Most

14 of this is within our papers, but, Judge, I will say that there 1 2 is a deep concern by our client, as I'm sure the Court is 3 aware --4 THE COURT: You're talking about the fourth factor 5 now, right? 6 MR. SUH: The fourth factor. 7 THE COURT: Yeah. 8 MR. SUH: Yeah; the fourth factor, which goes to 9 intimidation and harassment. 10 This case is, obviously, part of a series of other 11 matters that are ongoing, not just the London arbitration, but 12 another one, which I will let the Court know about in a moment. 13 But, in essence, there are -- in particular, there have been 14 threats against Mr. Ashot Egiazaryan's wife. Some of those 15 included the allegation that there would be revealed women that 16 he had relationships with. The fact that we have a picture of 17 Ashot Egiazaryan with a woman not his wife has caused 18 significant harm to their marriage. This has all happened 19 within the past week. I can represent to the Court I was at 20 least witness to some of that significant discord. 21 This series of events has been both a shock and very 22 difficult for Mr. Egiazaryan. He's been -- he's undergone 23 surveillance since about September 13th here in the United 24 States, per Denoro's investigator's own declaration, and that 25 surveillance has gone on, including other contacts, up to and

including even last night. And I think that the facts related to this, the harassment that is ongoing to Mr. Egiazaryan, are factors that the Court must take into consideration when ordering something as extreme as a videotaped deposition for the purpose that they've made this application.

I will say -- and I want to make clear, Judge -- I am not casting any specific aspersion on Mr. Mansfield or Mr. Stegeman or any of the counsel here. We have no indication that the surveillance or anything else was directed by Akin Gump or anyone else. I would represent to the Court that I know Mr. Mansfield; we have known each other for years. I am not making any aspersion against him or his firm.

THE COURT: I understand that.

MR. SUH: But it is -- there are other -- I think the problem is there are other undercurrents ongoing in this case which are extremely troubling.

And that, in fact, takes us to, I think, the look at the prejudice and the equities broadly here. If the deposition is ordered, that bell cannot be unrung. And we have a deep concern here that, although the Court can issue a protective order with respect to Denoro, there are many, many parties involved in a London arbitration. If the Court is interested, my partner, Larry Shore, who is co-chair of the firm's arbitration -- international arbitration group, who is going to try the arbitration in London, can give you more detail on the

parties and how they relate to each other. We even have a

chart for some of that if the Court is interested. But I will

say that once this deposition transcript is out, it's out in

the world, and we don't know how to control it or how it will

be used, and certainly, even though a court can issue an order

against Denoro, it is impossible to determine where that's

going to go.

We have a lot of concerns about other things. For example, there is slanderous website up that -www.ashotegiazaryan -- that's not his website. There is
nothing on it but information which is both false and
slanderous to Mr. Egiazaryan. If this deposition is
videotaped, we fully expect that videotape to be posted on that
website. If there is an issue related to the London
arbitration, we can go and have Mr. Shore address exactly how
limited the rights of taking a deposition in connection with
that proceeding will be and what the order of it will occur.

But I think the main point here is that this is part of a series of other cases. As the Court is aware, the Cypress injunction action is merely the action to prevent the dissipation of assets. This is really tied to the London arbitration; this case is about the London arbitration; and ordering it here would make it impossible to unring the bell or control its use in other -- in the other context.

I think the other issue which was raised in our

17 1 protective order is that there is no ability, at least as it 2 stands now, absent the Court's issuance of a protective order 3 along these lines, to have a deposition of Mr. Karamov --4 Mr. Karamov is, in fact, Denoro -- and have it work in the same way to allow a reciprocal advantage. If something like a deposition of Mr. Egiazaryan was to go forward, it would only 6 7 be fair in the context of allowing this early fact-gathering 8 process to have the same thing --9 THE COURT: I don't think that would be my 10 inclination. 1.1 MR. SUH: Okay. Thank you, Judge. 12 THE COURT: I think I will either grant the motion or 13 deny the motion, but --14 THE COURT: Mr. Suhr Thank you, Judge. 15 And the other prejudicial factors are, of course, 16 that Mr. Egiazaryan is here in the United States, as his wife's 17 declaration indicates, because he was -- in essence, received 18 such threats and intimidation that prompted his move here. 19 in order -- these are the same threats and intimidations as 20 will be developed in the other cases, which have come from the 21 parties, with which he is opposed to, and for them, Denoro and 22 others, to take the unfair advantage of those threats to get 23 deposition testimony that they would not have otherwise been 24 able to get if those threats had not existed would be -- would 25 really be a miscarriage of justice and would be, frankly, wrong

in the context of the way this case has unfolded.

Lastly -- and I want to be careful how I describe

this, because we have only very preliminary information -- but

we have recently received information that Mr. Egiazaryan is

the subject of a criminal investigation in Russia. We believe

that this criminal investigation is closely tied to and

prompted by the very parties that he has sued in connection

with the London arbitration. And we have not yet closely

examined what the potential allegations are, but I did want to

put the Court and counsel on notice that Russia has a similar

constitutional provision as our Fifth Amendment, and if this

deposition were to go forward, we would have to closely examine

the impact of what we have been informed in connection with

this Russian -- potential Russian proceeding or Russian

proceeding and the questions that are being asked.

And, again, this also goes back to the inability to unring the bell. If he were to be forced to ask questions with the pending Russian criminal investigation, it would put him in a potential violation of his Article 54 rights. Article 54 is the provision under Russian law which would allow him to claim what is a comparable privilege to the Fifth Amendment. And, so, I did want to put the Court on notice.

Two more points, Judge. The exigency that we have repeatedly heard about we believe is no exigency at all. This November 17th hearing date in Cypress is a date which was set

by Denoro's counsel. I would note that it was set six weeks or so after the initial appearance in the case and nothing had been done about getting Mr. Ashot Egiazaryan's deposition in place in a more timely fashion, and, so, therefore, that there should be no exigency created by Denoro itself.

We also believe that there is no exigency related to any billions of dollars. And that is in large part because Denoro transferred the shares that really would be the only shares that represent billions of dollars in the case at or about the same time the injunction went in place. And, so, in effect, we don't believe at all that there are billions of dollars at issue. Denoro is a shelf company in Cypress. It doesn't, to our knowledge, have any employees or officers or anything else, and we believe it's entirely Mr. Karamov, and that all of that is -- indicates that there is no exigency at all here. And if the Court needed additional time for its consideration of all the issues in place, we would --

THE COURT: You would be happy to give me the time.

(Laughter)

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MR. SUH: We would be happy to stipulate to move the November 17th date in Cypress and cooperate with counsel to do that so there is no hearing date, even though that the deposition transcript, we believe, and have submitted to our Cypriot counsel, would not be admissible in any case in connection with the November 17th hearing.

20 1 So, I believe I have taken -- I have addressed the 2 Intel factors and talked about the prejudice issues that are at 3 hand here. Judge, there is a discussion we would have about 4 some of the protective order components. I think that I would 5 hold on that, given the Court's comment, and if the Court 6 wanted to ask specific questions about our recommendation for a 7 protective order, that would be -- that would be fine. 8 THE COURT: I think until I decide the main motion, 9 that's premature. 10 MR. SUH: All right. 11 THE COURT: And we could do that telephonically if it 12 reaches that point. 13 Mr. Mansfield? 14 Thank you. 15 MR. MANSFIELD: Thank you, your Honor. 16 Mr. Egiazaryan obtained an ex parte order freezing 17 billions of dollars of assets which each day have caused 18 irreparable harm and prejudice to my client, Denoro Investments 19 Limited. What we're asking for is, and what we have obtained 20 from this Court, is a deposition subpoena in order to obtain 21 discovery to challenge that freezing order in the Cypress 22 court. There is a substantial risk, we understand from our 23 counsel in the Cypress action, that if we do not get this 24 deposition done before the 17th, it will not be accepted by the 25 Court there. This is our initial first opportunity --

22 1 exhibit to an affidavit the sworn evidence of a 2 person taken abroad." 3 THE COURT: An exhibit to an affidavit by an affiant, right? 4 5 MR. MANSFIELD: Right. The Court would accept the 6 transcript as an exhibit to an affidavit submitted in the 7 Cypress Court. So, you'd submit an affidavit and attached to 8 it would be the transcript of the deposition -- the sworn 9 testimony. 10 THE COURT: You think that the attorney could be the 11 affiant and attach the deposition transcript? 12 MR. MANSFIELD: Yes. That's how the procedure works 13 there. 14 THE COURT: Hold on to that thought, because I want 15 to hear your response. Okay. Yes? 16 MR. MANSFIELD: So, the purpose of this deposition, 17 your Honor, is solely focused and exclusively focused on the 18 Cypress action. There's been comment and papers and an 19 argument today about an arbitration in London. There is no 20 intent to use this in any way in the London arbitration. If 21 the Court were to issue an order that limited it solely to the 22 Cypress action we would not oppose that. That's all we want it 23 for. We would sign a stipulation to that effect. It's just to 24 clear the air. 25 There is no interest or strategy of using this

23 1 deposition in connection with the London arbitration. 2 purpose is to effectively challenge what has occurred in the 3 Cypress Court, which has damaged our client in terms of the 4 freezing order. It is that simple and straightforward. 5 With respect to the four factors, if I could briefly 6 review them, your Honor? 7 THE COURT: Just tell me again what evidence I have 8 before me of irreparable daily ongoing harm to Denoro. There 9 was one declaration that was fairly conclusory, but I don't 10 know whose declaration that was. 11 (Pause) 12 MR. MANSFIELD: In Exhibit A to -- we'll call them 13 G.T.'s declaration -- paragraph 9, and this is the order at 14 issue. "And this Court further orders and prohibits directors 15 of Denoro Investments Limited, its officers and 16 representatives" --17 THE COURT: That's the order --18 MR. MANSFIELD: Yes. 19 THE COURT: -- but what's the ongoing harm as we 20 Is there any evidence of exigent circumstances or 21 interruption to Denoro's businesses or --? 22 MR. MANSFIELD: Well, your Honor, by virtue of the 23 order, they're unable to engage in any of the real estate 24 financing business activities because of the imposition of the 25 freezing order. They can't operate as a real estate investment

24 1 business. It locks them up. There's simply nothing -- they 2 can't operate. 3 THE COURT: But the other side says apparently that a 4 lot of funds were transferred right prior to the injunction. 5 MR. MANSFIELD: I haven't seen any of it to that 6 effect, your Honor, at all, other than the representations. 7 THE COURT: It may be a wash for my purposes. 8 may just be a draw on this issue. But go ahead. You were 9 going to talk about the Intel factor. 10 MR. MANSFIELD: Intel factors. I wanted to start 11 with what is often referred to as the fourth factor first, 12 because I think it sort of sets the stage for this. This Court 13 is sort of being asked to be sitting in the place of a Cypress 14 Court judicial official making decisions and that's not 1.5 necessary under 1782. 16 What we're seeking is a deposition, plain and simple. It is not burdensome; no documents whatsoever have been 17 18 requested. It is only for use in the Cypress action; no way 19 used in any other way for any other litigation; a one-day 20 discovery event. That's what we're looking at. 21 The Court properly exercised its discretion in 22 issuing the deposition subpoena based on the factors because 23 this type of discovery is not available in the foreign 24 proceedings. And as the declaration of G.T. demonstrates, the

Cypress Court would not be hostile to receiving a transcript of

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this deposition in connection with the Cypress proceedings.

Now, I know that Mr. Egiazaryan's counsel have produced an opposing deposition on the point. They disagree about its admissibility and its receipt in evidence. That leads to the question that I think the Court referred to earlier of admissibility. That is not a question for this Court. It's the question for the Cypress Court at the end of the day, what they will admit and what they will not admit. But that shouldn't influence the strict application of 1782 factors in granting the opportunity to take the deposition.

The factor about circumventing substantive Cypress discovery limitations; I want to clear this up a bit. There's a distinction that we see in the case law when the Courts talk about this third Intel factor between substantive limitations and procedural. And I do think they make it quite clear what the difference is and the clarity is in our favor and the Servicio Pan Americano case probably says it in the clearest way, but in short, what they're talking about there is if there's a substantive limitation, they mean an issue of privilege. You can't go there. It's privileged. And if you're trying to use 1782 to circumvent a rule prohibiting invasion of privilege or some other protected, inadmissible area, that's a substantive limitation.

Procedural limitations about what might be available in the Rules of Civil Procedure in the Cypress Court are not

considered circumventing. And the language on page 6 of the Servicio Pan Americano case, I think, says it very clearly in referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Intel.

"The Supreme Court recognized in the Intel case that a foreign Court's procedural discovery limitations, as opposed to substantive limits on the admissibility of discovered evidence, should not prevent a district court from enabling a foreign litigant to obtain admissible evidence here to Section 1782."

And I think that really does clear up what we're dealing with here. This is not a circumvention of a substantive Cypress limitation at all.

THE COURT: Doesn't that depend on which attorney I'm persuaded by? Which declaration I'm persuaded by?

MR. MANSFIELD: I would say no, your Honor, because I think at the end of the day the Cypress Court is the Court that makes the decision. This Court -- 1782 and as you read -- as one reads Intel and the other cases, this is a broad effort in this statute to encourage discovery for purposes of efficiency and reciprocity. And so, it is a statutory vehicle that is about encouraging and being broad, as long as you meet the discretionary factors, obviously. It's not without limits.

But if you meet those discretionary factors, it is about allowing and encouraging the gathering of evidence to encourage other countries to reciprocate in the future. But

27 1 it's always left to the tribunal litigating the matter and that 2 judge to make those decisions about admissibility and its own 3 laws within the jurisdiction. 4 And really, I think what this comes out to is a very 5 straightforward application for a non-burdensome, seven-hour 6 deposition. We're prepared to begin it today or finish it 7 today if we can. The Court, I think properly, waived the 8 factors and exercised its discretion in granting the deposition 9 subpoena. I don't think anything has been --10 THE COURT: That was untested. That was ex parte. I 11 mean, I have the whole thing in front of me now and, obviously, 12 it's a much more complicated question than it was in October. 13 But go ahead. 14 MR. MANSFIELD: I wanted to -- having addressed those 15 four factors -- just address a few of the arguments that Mr. 16 Suh raised. A claim of prejudice that they're making that if 17 the deposition is order, the bell cannot be unrung. Well, with 18 all due respect, we disagree. 19 I mean, if we go forward with the deposition, and I 20 believe we should under 1782, they will have an opportunity to 21 argue in the Cypress Court that it should not be admitted. 22 That's the only Court we're looking at here. So, if they want 23 to call that unringing the bell, they get to challenge it

We're

later, but we get to have our 1782 rights and go forward.

then can unring the bell. There's no prejudice there.

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in the course of a discovery procedure.

The second claimed prejudice is that, well, if you order a deposition it's going to get out and it will prejudice them. I don't believe if there really is a need, and I don't believe there's a need, but if there really is an articulated need to take steps to prevent against dissemination, including orders covering counsel, I mean, we're capable of doing those things. In certain cases, Courts make those orders and we follow orders. So, I don't see any prejudice in doing it. I think it needs to get done to protect Denoro's rights in pursuing its challenge to the freezing order.

And there were a few other -- just to address -- arguments made about Denoro not moving in a timely fashion in its 1782 application; that we waited until too close to this date that is so important. And I think, frankly, that's unfair. While they didn't challenge the threshold element we needed to prove that Mr. Egiazaryan was in this district, that actually did require some time and effort to prove up and I know that there were comments made about surveillance.

But in order to appropriately apply for a 1782 application, we needed to have evidence that we could provide to the Court that showed he was, in fact, in the district.

That took some time. Obviously, if we could have brought this earlier and we had that evidence, we would have done it. So, I don't think that was a fair criticism of the way in which we've

handled our application.

And then, lastly, I would add that the notion of attempting to move the November 17th date would have no irreparable harm on us is just simply not true. The terms of the orders essentially lock up the business activities.

Obviously, they obtained the freezing order because they wanted to do that. They would love a delay because it continues the order that they obtained ex parte.

We haven't had a chance yet -- we haven't had a chance as we're having today to actually address that in the Cypress Court. So, moving that date back would be grossly unfair to us and continue the prejudice and irreparable harm to us. And we would be very opposed to that.

THE COURT: Any brief comment about the potential Russian prosecution?

MR. MANSFIELD: I don't know personally anything about it. I don't -- the first I learned about it was hearing Mr. Suh say what he said today. I wasn't aware of those things and it has no relevance as far as we are concerned. This is a very narrowly focused, specifically tailored effort to get a one-day deposition, no documents, in order to effectively avail ourselves of our rights to challenge a freezing order covering billions of dollars and we're entitled under 1782 and we would ask that the Court allow the deposition to go forward this afternoon.

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               Thank you, your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                           Thank you. Yes?
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               MR. SUH: Judge, may I remain at counsel table?
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    have --
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               THE COURT:
                           Sure. Of course.
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               MR. SUH: -- all the declarations in front of me.
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               Judge, we'll be -- I'll be brief.
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               First, I would like to address, I think, the Court's
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    comment about Cypriot procedure and about which attorney you
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    would be persuaded by in connection with the Cypriot
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    injunction.
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               I would direct the Court -- first, I'd make the
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    comment that our Cypriot counsel provided a very detailed and
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    thorough declaration which was very specific on each of the
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    points. And contrary to that, I believe Mr. Triantafyllides,
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    their expert, was very careful and cautious in the way he
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    described how this could be used in the Cypriot procedure.
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    I'd like to read the entirety of Paragraph 5 to you. There are
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    only three substantive paragraphs that address procedures.
                                                                  In
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    Mr. Triantafyllides' declaration. But it reads as follows:
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               Paragraph 5 begins,
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               "Under Cyprus law and procedure, no mechanism exists
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               for taking depositions. However, based on my 30
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              years of case experience in Cyprus courts, the lack
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               of such a formal mechanism does not prevent in my
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opinion the Court from taking into account deposition testimony taken in other countries such as the United States provided it is produced in court in the proper way.

"For example, attached is exhibit to an affidavit filed in Cypress in support of the opposition to the Cypress injunctive proceeding."

We then go to the portion that was read in Court:

"Further under Cypriot civil procedure rules in my

opinion out-of-court evidence is allowed in

applications for interim injunctions like the present

one; and therefore, the court will admit as an

exhibit to an affidavit the sworn evidence of a

person taken abroad."

I think this is a very carefully drafted paragraph, and we actually read it a number of times and talked about it in great detail with our expert in drafting our declaration.

And, you know, I think the fundamental point here is that the -- Mr. Triantafyllides is saying there is -- the lack of such a formal mechanism does not prevent the Court from taking into account deposition testimony which again is very different than the detailed analysis provided by Mr. Haviaras given orders 39 and 48 during the procedure. And I think perhaps it would be easier to have the Court, if it wished, review orders 39 and 48. But from the way they are written, it is I think to my

32 1 mind supports Mr. Haviaras' affirm opinion which is repeated 2 throughout his declaration that the -- and I'm reading from 3 Paragraph 26 --4 "In my opinion, given the procedures prescribed in 5 orders 38 and 48, the Cypriot Court would not only be 6 unreceptive to evidence obtained in a deposition in 7 the United States but also could not accept the 8 transcript of the examination of a non-affiant such 9 as Mr. Ashot Egiazaryan because to do so would 10 contravene the Cypriot civil procedure rules and 11 destroy the integrity of the injunctive proceeding." 12 So I think --13 THE COURT: What is the definition of an affiant? 14 Could it be an attorney attaching a deposition transcript or 15 does it have to be someone with percipient knowledge about the 16 litigation? 17 MR. SUH: Judge, I believe that's addressed in the orders but I must admit I can't answer that question right now. 18 19 But I --20 MR. MANSFIELD: Your Honor, if it would be helpful, I 21 don't there would be dispute but I believe the lawyers are the 22 affiants in the Cyprus court proceedings. 23 MR. SPEAKER: That's not true. The Cyprus --24 (Several parties reply negatively) 25 MR. MANSFIELD: But we disagree then.

MR. SUH: We agree to disagree.

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2 But, Judge, I mean, I think one of the things to look at in examining the structure here is that the affiant process 3 is to put forth evidence. If they simply attach Mr. 4 5 Egiazaryan's deposition transcript, they have to -- they are, 6 in effect, producing no other independent evidence of their 7 There would be no opportunity to cross examine their 8 affiant underneath the rules which is what I think the 9 integrity of the injunctive proceeding is about. I mean, would 10 our right be to cross examine the lawyer saying this is the 11 deposition of Ashot Egiazaryan? Of course, it's the deposition of Ashot Egiazaryan. It doesn't allow us the reciprocal right. 13 They have the right to cross examine Artem Egiazaryan. But in our case, if they get -- excuse me. They cross -- yeah, Artem 15 Eqiazaryan.

In our case, if they attach Asot Egiazaryan's deposition, we are being offered the ability to merely cross examine our own client or cross examine on a fact which is utterly not in dispute which is that this is his deposition transcript.

And I think when you look at it in that structure, it just shows you how much this requested discovery is attempting to turn the Cypriot procedure on its head.

In essence, it would avoid -- and we would plainly submit, your Honor, the reason why this is being done in this

fashion is that no officer or employee can be submitted because frankly, Carimav (phonetic) is Mr. -- Mr. Carimav is Denoro.

And in fact, we have counsel for Mr. Carimav present here in the courtroom today. And it's plainly an attempt to circumvent the procedural structure in place in Cyprus.

And the fact that their lawyer has carefully crafted a paragraph where he says there is nothing preventing the Court from taking into account this deposition, does plainly -- it's not even -- not even this deposition -- says there's nothing preventing the Court from taking into account deposition testimony. So not even addressed to this -- to an injunction proceeding that I think -- I think this plainly weighs in our favor.

unringing the bell, we feel quite strongly about this. The -once the deposition transcript is submitted in the Cyprus
action, there has been -- once it is to clients and persons
involved, in particular we are concerned about Mr. Carimav
because he does control and is deeply involved with many of the
entities that are part of the London arbitration, there's no
way to control that particular transcript. And again, I cast
no aspersion on Mr. Mansfield or Mr. Stegeman or Akin Gump but
once the transcript is out -- and by the way, this decision -it's claimed that there's no videotape necessary but once the
transcript alone is out, there's no way to control it in a

35 1 foreign jurisdiction. Those parties that could use it in this 2 case are not within this Court's jurisdiction, and there's no 3 way to fashion an appropriate protective order to account for 4 it. 5 And, Judge, just to make clear. We're not saying 6 that any of these issues alone should be determinative. We 7 don't believe any of these issues alone are determinative. But 8 when you take a step back and look at whether or not it is appropriate for a U.S. Court to exercise its power to order 9 10 this deposition in the context of all of these factors, we 11 think it's -- it is -- it would be plainly inappropriate. 12 I'm going to leave this last point about the billions 13 of dollars for last but I would like to say in advance of that 14 that the need to establish his presence in Los Angeles -- if 15 you turn to --16 THE COURT: I'm sorry. The need to what? 17 MR. SUH: Presence -- presence in Los Angeles, your 18 If you turn to the declaration of Lawrence Wiist, I 19 read from Paragraph 3. 20 "I have been monitoring Mr. Egiazaryan to ascertain 21 his residence starting in mid-September 2010 -- " 22 Mid-September. 23 "-- and continuing on a day-to-day basis to the 24 present date. On 43 occasions and at varying times 25 throughout the day including 9:15 a.m., 12:26 p.m.,

36 1 2:20 p.m. and 8:26 p.m. I have observed A. Egiazaryan 2 depart from 65 Endrino Place (phonetic), visit 3 different public venues throughout Los Angeles and consistently return. 5 "I most recently -- " 6 "-- returned to 65 Endrino Place. 7 "I most recently observed him on October 24, 2010, 8 depart from 65 Endrino Place and return there 9 visiting a venue in Los Angeles." 10 Forty-three occasions from mid-September. 11 review the bidding, your Honor, on the timeline here. 12 September 13th, the London arbitration, request for arbitration 13 was filed. September 15th, the Cyprus injunction proceeding 14 was filed. September 17th, the -- what is, in effect, the TRO 15 in place was put in place. On November 1st, there was a 16 briefing schedule in place suggested -- excuse me. 17 I don't think -- I believe it was six weeks prior. 18 September 27th, excuse me. On September 27th, the 19 November 17th date was set by Denoro in the Cyprus court. 20 So he's been under surveillance here in Los Angeles 21 per Mr. Wiist's declaration since mid-September. And if there 22 truly was an exigent circumstance, then you would think, number 23 one, this would have been brought sooner; and number two, that 24 six weeks wouldn't have been set for this hearing on November 25 17th by Denoro on September 27th.

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And so for all of these factors, I think there is no exigent circumstance that is not at least at part if not wholly created by Denoro.

And, Judge, I would make the following representation about the comment by counsel that this is a simple, one-day event. Obviously, Judge, we have spent substantial amounts of time preparing an opposition. If it were only tied to this Cyprus and it didn't have an impact on everything else ongoing, we wouldn't do this. The reason why we are contesting and moving to quash is not because Mr. Egiazaryan wants to spend a substantial amount of money having counsel in here fight over a one-day deposition. We're here because of all of these other moving pieces in place. And it is -- it would occur at a very delicate time in the London arbitration -- just -- the procedures have not yet begun. It's not even at issue. just received two days ago the response to the request for arbitration. And the preliminary stage that this Cyprus is at and, I think, again this factor alone wouldn't govern and shouldn't govern the Court's assessment of the case. But it is one of a number of factors that give you the picture, the holistic approach which we think that the Supreme Court Intel was encouraging us to follow.

And with that, I think I would turn to this billions of dollars issue because we did think this was going to come up. We made a chart, and I'm going to actually have Mr. Shore

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     -- can you give a copy (indiscernible)
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              Let's put this right here.
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              MR. SPEAKER: Your Honor, may I approach the Clerk
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     for a copy for you?
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              MR. MANSFIELD: Your Honor, I --
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              THE COURT: I'm not sure --
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              MR. MANSFIELD: Obviously, they spent some time on
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    this chart but we were never provided this before just now.
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              THE COURT: I'm not sure it's going to be helpful to
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         I mean, I understand the general transaction at issue.
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    Why don't you just make your point without it; and then if I
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    need it, I'll tell you.
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              MR. SUH: Judge, I think the central point is is that
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    the -- that Denoro which is the red box holds with others
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    Limerick (phonetic), which is a BVI (phonetic) company, which
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    holds Tribolen (phonetic), which is a Cypriot company, which
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    holds Decorum (phonetic). And Decorum is the entity that held
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    the Decmos (phonetic) shares. Decmos is the entity that had as
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    its asset the Mosclo Hotel (phonetic). And the -- Decorum
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    liquidated the Decmos shares --
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              THE COURT: I understand what you're saying.
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              MR. SUH: -- on September 17th. So there are no --
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    there aren't billions of dollars. What there are, Judge, is
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    there are notes but the notes don't total anywhere near a
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    billion dollars. They total about $80 million. And, frankly,
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because they are held by entities that are controlled by Mr. Carimav, it is — they are essentially not at issue here. We don't believe at this juncture that the issue has anything to do with billions of dollars. It would be wonderful if there were billions of dollars in Denoro that were actually frozen. That's simply not the case.

We had, in fact, -- we're -- the reason why we wanted, in fact, this injunction against all these entities because at the time that it was put in place we didn't know. And we also don't know how funds will get transferred in and out of these entities if that occurs at a later date. So that's -- I'm just saying that because they may answer the question well if, Mr. Suh, there's no shares in there. Why don't you just release the injunction and have this be done with? Although we have considered that, I think the concern is that we don't know where all this money is being transferred in and out of. And it is an entity that could be used for this purpose and we're trying to be very careful on how we proceed, given the large amount of money at issue in the Lemon (phonetic) arbitration.

And I think -- and just to follow up on that, no

Denoro officer or employee or director has submitted a

declaration here. We think in large part this procedure is a

way to prevent that from happening in the Cypriot court; which,

again, is a stratagem that should not be given credence by this

40 1 court. 2 THE COURT: Mr. Mansfield. Thank you. 3 MR. MANSFIELD: Thank you, your Honor. Just a couple 4 of sort of clean-up points. 5 There's no evidence or declaration submitted on any 6 This is argument. We weren't given this last night. 7 They obviously spent some time preparing the chart. There's 8 nothing in the record to support it. 9 THE COURT: I'll let you go over the chart. 10 the argument. 11 MR. MANSFIELD: And the argument as well is not 12 supported by anything in the record. 13 Also, very briefly. This issue of the time it took 14 to do the surveillance to meet the perfunctory first step of 15 the application. The standard that we had to prove was whether 16 he lives in the district. Out -- you can see someone a number 17 of times in an area and they might be visiting and we certainly 18 wouldn't want to jump the gun because we know what they would 19 claim if we did. So obviously some decision was made at a 20 point when they thought that determination could be made. So 21 the notion that this wasn't exigent and it wasn't important and 22 we weren't moving diligently is simply not correct. 23 Now, the key point, the key point that I think was 24 discussed is the declarations, the opposing declarations. 25 there were comments, criticisms made of our declarant because

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his deposition was rather general in saying that the transcript could be used in the Cypriot court proceeding.

Well, I would say this. There's clearly a disagreement among experts of Cypriot law. It will ultimately have to be decided there. However, what's most important is the argument or the reasoning presented by their expert is inconsistent with the standards for 1782. All of those detailed paragraphs and the references to Cypriot civil procedure are missing the point. It's not the point when you go to the law that interprets 1782 Intel and Servicio Pan Americano (phonetic). Again, page 6, interpreting Intel, the Supreme Court recognized in Intel that a foreign court's procedural discovery limitations, allowed to take depositions -- whatever the other ones are -- as opposed to substantive limits on admissibility for privilege or other reasons, should not prevent a district court from enabling a foreign litigant, Denoro, to obtain admissible evidence under 1782. So all the detail arguments about their rules of civil procedure missed the point. To the extent the declarants disagree on whether it's admissible, the Cypriot court will make that decision and they will make whatever is the correct decision based on what they're presented.

I would like to make one other point that I think has sort of maybe gotten lost or I haven't featured before and that is, we have a deposition. The deposition is going to be

helpful in attacking the freezing order. The deposition is also going to be helpful because the information learned will lead to the discovery of other evidence, documents, other witnesses, other things that we can do in challenging it. So there are multiple purposes and benefits that this foreign evidence gathering through 1782 provides to Denoro in order to avail itself of its first upcoming opportunity to challenge this freezing order and we've urged the court to allow the deposition to go forward.

THE COURT: Do you want to make one brief comment or?

MR. SUH: Very brief, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SUH: I find Mr. Mansfield's last comment a little inexplicable because that seems to favor exactly the reason why a deposition shouldn't be ordered if it's for wide ranging discovery which is not contemplated at all in the Cypriot structure. And again, I think it brings us back to this: It's not the type of discovery that is available. Not whether or not the deposition -- a deposition is available. The issue is whether or not the evidence is available for the purposes that they want to use it. And the evidence, which is -- this is the first I've heard there's some other reason they want to get a Section 1782 deposition -- but for the purpose of attacking Artem Egiazaryan's affidavit, that evidence is available. That evidence is the cross examination Artem

43 1 Egiazaryan. And with that we would submit, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: All right. Thank you-all. 3 I'm going to need until about 2:00, 2:30 to issue a 4 If I do order the deposition to go forward, it will 5 have to commence sometime mid-afternoon and go until completed. 6 And that's not to indicate that I'm about to order the 7 deposition to go forward but I'm just telling you I can't rush 8 myself more than I have and I need to review some things before 9 I make, hopefully an intelligent ruling. Obviously it's not 10 going to be a lengthy written ruling because I -- well, it's 11 not going to be a lengthy written ruling. And if I prohibit 12 the deposition from going forward then Denoro may wish to seek 13 review of that immediately, so that's another reason that I 14 don't want to promise any kind of a lengthy written ruling. 15 And finally, if I do permit the deposition to go 16 forward, I'd like counsel to be available telephonically to 17 discuss any need for a protective order or any other details. 18 Am I sufficiently opaque about how I'm going to rule (laughs) 19 because I really don't know. 20 Any questions? 21 MR. SUH: No, your Honor. Just to be clear that if 22 it is possible that the court orders a deposition, that we will 23 have an opportunity to address some of the protective order 24 issues --25 THE COURT: Right.

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              MR. SUH: -- telephonically.
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               THE COURT: Right.
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              MR. SUH: And we would also, if the court is thinking
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     along those lines -- we didn't get to this point but there are
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     certainly less intrusive ways than to conduct a videotaped
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     deposition in person. Perhaps one of those would even be a
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     written series of questions. There are a lot of ways to skin
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     this cat. And at the end of the day, I think one of the things
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     we need to do and we will assert to the court we will do is
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     immediately begin to get to the bottom of these allegations in
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     Russia because that may cover a lot of what they seek to
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    discover.
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               THE COURT: All right. Thank you-all very much.
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              MR. SUH:
                         Thank you, Judge.
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              MR. UNIDENTIFIED: Your Honor, there is one other
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    housekeeping issue. Mr. Elliott Lauer (phonetic) has a pro
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    hoc --
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              THE COURT: Yes, I signed both of those.
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              MR. UNIDENTIFIED: I think there were three in total.
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              THE COURT: Oh, I only saw two.
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              MR. UNIDENTIFIED: There's Mr. Shore (phonetic),
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    there was Mr. Butler -- which I have these two.
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              THE COURT: I'm sure I'll sign the third one but I've
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    signed two.
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                                  Okay.
              MR. UNIDENTIFIED:
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                THE COURT: Okay.
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           (Attorneys thank the Court)
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                Thank you.
           (Proceeding adjourned at 11:17 a.m.)
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CERTIFICATION

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Jon Hudson

November 15, 2010

Signed

Dated

TONI HUDSON, TRANSCRIBER